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Book Review
The Death of Contract. By Grant Gilmore. Columbus: Ohio University
Press, 1974. Pp. ix, 151.
Grant Gilmore's writing has illuminated many parts of the lawscape,
from thorny thickets in which he is expert,' to bleak backwoods of which
he knows nothing and, better yet, is known to know nothing. 2 This little
book plays on an acre or two of which he knows a good deal. It tells,
simply, the story of the rise and fall of the American classical theory of
contract. For Professor Gilmore's countless former students, there is little
new here; it is, as he would say, "old hat." But even for them, this is a
rare find: a beautifully written story about law. For those new to Gilmore's
work, it is that and more; it is an ideal introduction to the work of one
of today's great American common lawyers.
The Death of Contract3 is a difficult book to categorize. Its stated
goal is to refute the argument that: "Contract, being dead, is no longer
a fit or worthwhile subject of study."'4 Professor Gilmore concedes that
the American classical theory of contract5 is but a relic of time past, but
suggests that: "In plotting our course, the best we have to go by is some
knowledge of where we have come from."
Any book whose subject is "where we have come from" is likely
7
to be treated as history. Gilmore treats Holmes's The Common Law
that way and has a great deal of fun with it in those terms. 8 The Death
1. Notably, G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965),
winner of the Ames Prize (1966) and the Coif Award of the A.A.L.S. (1967) and
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (2d ed. 1975). Professor Gilmore
is also co-editor, with Friedrich Kessler, of F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS (1970).
2. Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. Ci.L. REV. 103 (1970),
which begins with an expression of "blank astonishment" at being invited to give this
paper: "In speculating on what the committee on arrangements could have had in mind
the only plausible explanation I have been able to come up with is this: it was decided
that the Conference would be enlivened by a contribution from a lawyer who knew
nothing - and was known to know nothing - either about economic theory or about
current trends in what has come to be called Products Liability. . . . My function is
evidently to comment, in a childlike fashion, on these mysteries - more or less, it
may be, like the little boy who, rightly or wrongly, cried out in mid-procession that
the Emperor had no clothes on." Id.
3. Hereinafter referred to as GILMORE.
4. GILMORE at 3.
5. Hereinafter, "Contract" refers to the American classical theory.

6. GILMORE at 4.
7. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (M. HOWE ed. 1963).
8. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 37, 40, 43 and 70 infra.
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of Contract, like The Common Law, is historical in form and runs the
same risk of being taken at face value, of being scoured for factual inaccuracy. That approach, in my view, misses the point of this work
which, it may be, is more easily sensed than stated.
Professor Gilmore is a humanist, trained in language and in literature
before coming to the law. In these four lectures, 9 he takes an ironic
rhetorical stance more literary than legal; the result is a fable about law.
It happens to be about American contract law, about Langdell and Holmes
and Williston and Cardozo and Corbin. But its moral goes beyond the
law of contract; it is, in essence, that: "Law, by its nature, reflects what
is - not, except to the extent dictated by the idea of cultural lag, what
was and never what will be."' 0 Or, as he puts it elsewhere: "Let us stop
talking about World Peace through Law: conceivably we might get World
Law through Peace . ..but not the other way around."" In this view,
any attempt to tinker with the common law from on high, to purify it,
to resolve its ambiguities, to overhaul it according to the decided preferences
of one man, or two, or three is doomed to reversal by the tides of time.
And that is roughly how Gilmore characterizes the creation of the general
theory of contract advanced by Langdell, developed by Holmes and
Williston, and subjected to a "lingering death" by Cardozo and Corbin.
The story begins with Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of
Harvard Law School, making the "great discovery" that "there was such
a thing as a general law - or theory - of contract," an idea which
"seems never to have occurred to the legal mind" before, but which
Langdell "somehow stumbled across"' 2 while putting together his casebook
on Contracts, published in 1871.15 This is, of course, the purest hyperbole.
There were relatively mature formulations of a general contract theory in
England before Langdell's time, 14 and Professor Gilmore would have done
well to alert his readers to the dangers of reading him literally. As a
literary device, however, this use of hyperbole is effective in giving the
author the rhetorical stance from which to develop his theme.
9. This book is based on lectures delivered at the Ohio State University Law
School in April, 1970.
10. GILMORE at 9.
11. Gilmore, Law, Anarchy and History, 14 U. CHI. L.S. REc. 1, 6 (1966).

A

curiously parallel theme is to be found in Llewellyn, What Law Cannot Do for InterRacial Peace, 3 VILL. L. REv. 30 (1957).
12. GILMOR at 6.

13. C. LANGDELL,

CASES ON CoNTACrs

(1871).

14. Perhaps the first effort at such a formulation was the vain attempt to organize
English contract law according to Roman law principles: H. BRACToN, ON THE LAWS
AND CusToms OF ENGLAND (S. Thorne ed. 1968); J. SELDON, AD FLETAM DissERTio
(1647, D. Ogg. ed. 1925); In more modern times, J. POWELL, LAW OF CONTRACTS
(1802); C. COMYN, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1807), J. CHiTTY, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1826), J. SMITH, THE LAW OF CONTRACS (1847), preceded Langdell.
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Langdell's classical theory was that of a scientist. A product of his
age, he believed that law "consists of certain principles and doctrines"
and that it was "possible to take such a branch of law as Contracts, for
example, and . . .to select, classify and arrange all the cases which had

contributed in any important degree to the growth, development, or estab....
-15 And that is roughly what
lishment of any of its essential doctrines
His
product,
contained
in
the
casebook
of 1871 and the Summary
he did.
of the Law of Contracts (1880), was a highly logical construct. Gilmore
comments: "It is fair to say that the theory of contract did not come as a
natural result of a continuing case-law development; in fact it represented
a sharp break with the past, even the recent past." 16 It was put together
with "whatever bits and pieces of case law, old and new, could be made
to fit the theory," the "wrong" cases being ignored or dismissed with
"Langdellian certitude." The theory "was in its origins, and continued
to be during its life, an ivory tower abstraction. Its natural habitat was the
'17
law schools, not the law courts.
The particular school in which Contract was cultivated was Langdell's
Harvard. His introducing a full-time faculty there i8 made possible, as
never before, the teaching and development of a highly abstract law,
unfamiliar to the courts. So too did the case method. Langdell was not,
strictly speaking, the "inventor"' 9 of this way of teaching, 20 but he was
the first to shape the approach of an entire school to it. Whether by
accident or design, this method of teaching facilitated the formation of
Contract. Putting together a selection of cases is an excellent way to edit
the law; attorneys do it every day. Teaching from selected cases is an
excellent way to advance an edited version of a whole field of law.
But Langdell "did little more than launch the idea that there was or should be - such a thing as a general theory of contract."'21 Holmes,
mainly through The Common Law, 22 and Williston, in his "magisterial

treatise, '23 developed the theory; Holmes "in broad philosophical outline,"
24
Williston "in meticulous, although not always accurate, scholarly detail."
The resulting body of doctrine, most completely reduced to writing in
Williston's multi-volume treatise, was nothing if not internally consistent.
It was, at once, the product of and a shrine to certainty; that was its
great strength. Logic was its guiding principle, inflexibility its fundamental
15. Preface to Langdell's casebook, quoted by GILMORE at 12.
16. GILMORE at 17.
17. Id. at 17-18.
18. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 528 (1973).
19. GILMORE at 59.
20. John Norton Pomeroy taught by the case method at New York University
Law School in the 1860's. J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 261 (1950).
21. GILMORE at 13-14.
22. These lectures, originally delivered at Harvard Law School, were published
in 1881.
23. S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920).
24. GILMORE at 14.
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failing. Time brought changes in the way commerce was conducted and
exposed the certainty as dogma. For "[t]he 'general theory' required that,
always and everywhere, things remain as they had, in theory, always
25
been."
Professor Gilmore describes the content of the Holmes-Williston
construct "impressionistically rather than scientifically" and, having completed "that chore," returns to "the far more interesting business" of
speculating on why it was so influential.2 6 There is a warning here: his
description of the "construct" is in much the same vein as the hyperbole
with which he began his story 27 and should be treated accordingly. It is
the first of several doctrinal caricatures, designed to emphasize the thinking
behind the doctrine rather than the doctrine itself.
According to Gilmore, the theory "seems to have been dedicated to the
'28
proposition that, ideally, no one should be liable to anyone for anything.
The ideal was unattainable, but a very narrow range of liability - a
certain range - was not only desirable, it was concomitant with a strict
notion of Contract. The contract was the bargain. Before it was struck,
neither party was liable to the other; afterwards, liability was that, and
only that, which the bargain encompassed. There could be no liability for
damage suffered beyond the confines of the bargain. The parties could,
indeed should, place its limits where they pleased. But beyond them, Contract had no application. The only legitimate test of liability was the bargain
itself. Foreseeable, or likely, consequences of breach were not a part of
the agreement solely by virtue of their natural relationship to it. Natural
relationships were the province of tort. Contractual relationships accorded
with nothing but the desires of those who created them. In a burgeoning
free-enterprise system, that was, after all, how it had to be.
Just as the bargain was the measure of liability, liability was no more
than the price of the bargain. There was no morality involved, no punitive
element to damages. "In every case," said Holmes, the law leaves the
contracting party "free to break his contract if he chooses. '29 There could
be no material distinction between a willful breach and an innocent breach,
for the price of breach was agreed at the outset.
The corollary of limiting liability to these narrow confines was that,
within them, obligations were absolute. If merchants were to transact
precisely as they chose, without obeisance to some amorphous societal
standard, then, having chosen, they were bound. Natural relationships
were no more appropriate as an excuse for non-performance than as a
measure of liability for breach. As Holmes put it: "The only universal
consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 14.
See text accompanying note 12 supra.
GILMORE at 14.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (M. HOWE ed. 1963).
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promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass."' 0
Excuses such as impossibility and mistake were frowned upon; contracts
were to be enforced as made. If performance was impossible, damages
would have to do. If a mistake had been made, it would prove expensive.
Pervading this approach was a suspicion of implied terms. Courts
were no more than neutral umpires lending enforcement powers to the
contract. To imply terms was to go beyond what was written, to introduce
values from without, to run the risk of subjectivity in enforcing a bargain
which others had created.
At the heart of this construct, the "balance-wheel of the great machine," 3' was Holmes's "bargain theory" of consideration. According to
Professor Gilmore, the prevailing view of consideration before Holmes
was that developed by the English courts: "Any benefit would do; any
detriment would do."'3 2 If the promisee either conferred a benefit on the
promisor, or incurred a detriment to himself, in response to the promise,
then there was consideration; the promise was binding. For this, Gilmore
cites Kent's Commentaries.33 But: "The new day dawned with Holmes." 34
According to Holmes, "The root of the whole matter is the relation of
reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other, between consideration and promise."35 Any benefit, any detriment, simply would not do.
"[T]he promise and the consideration must purport to be the motive each
for the other ....,,1 Only such benefit or detriment as had been bargained
for could bind. Hence, the "bargain theory." In Gilmore's view, this
formulation had no support in the cases. It was put forward as the theoretical underpinning for the strictly limited notion of contractual liability
propogated by the Holmesians. "It seems perfectly clear that Holmes
was, quite consciously, proposing revolutionary doctrine and was not in
the least interested in stating or restating the common law as it was." 3 7
Gilmore continues: "[T] he next step was the extension of the newlyminted theory of consideration to the entire life-history of a contract,
from birth to death."38 It was used to explain why offers expressed to
be irrevocable were revocable until accepted; why the modification of an
ongoing contract, by which A promised to pay B more than originally
agreed, was not binding on A; and why a release from part of an obliga30. Id., quoted by GILMORE at 14.
31. GILMORE at 18.
32. Id. at 19.
33. 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 465 (4th ed. 1840). "Holmes,
who edited the twelfth edition of Commentaries (1872), let the passage stand without
comment." GILMORE at 111 n.34.
34. GILMORE at 19.
35. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 230 (M. HOwE ed. 1963), supra, quoted by
GILMORE at 20.
36. Wisconsin & Mich. Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903).
37. GILMORE at 20.
38. Id. at 21.
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tion to pay money did not release at all.39 Each "rule" was supported
by an English case, but: "[A] ccommodation of the cases to the newfangled
theory required something like major surgery on the cases themselves." 40
Professor Gilmore demonstrates the extent of this "major surgery"
in a fascinating and instructive analysis of the three English cases from
which Holmes extracted his "rules." For example, Holmes took his
"rule" on revocability of offers from Dickinson v. Dodds.41 In that
case,
an offer to sell real property was to be "left over" until Friday. On
learning of an earlier sale to a third person, the offeree attempted to
"accept" the offer before the Friday deadline. Upon Dodds's refusal
to convey, Dickinson sued. The Court of Appeals held for the offeror, Dodds, on
the grounds that the two parties had not agreed to the same thing at the
same time. By the time Dickinson had agreed to buy, Dodds was no longer
willing to sell to him. There had been no "meeting of the minds. ' 42
Holmes, scorning such "subjective" analysis, offered want of consideration
as the true ground of decision. There had been no consideration for Dodds's
agreeing to wait. Later, Williston went further, applying the Holmesian
"rule" to situations where irrevocability was expressed more explicitly
than in the principal case. Professor Gilmore's analysis of this, and the
other two cases which bore Holmes his "rules," is designed to show that
they "had been generalized into abstractions that had little or nothing
to do with the cases themselves. ' 43 This case analysis is one of the high
44
points of the book.
One of the prime characteristics of the Langdellian-HolmesianWillistonian school was what Gilmore terms "objectification." We have
already encountered one example: the avoidance of "meeting of the minds"
as an appropriate criterion for formation of a contract. This is a particular
example of the general displacement of subjective inquiry by "objectification." This was an effort to limit factual inquiry by the formation of clear
legal "rules" which were to be applied with absolute consistency. Ideally,
the "rule" would preclude any appeal to the subjective.
A further example of this process, demonstrating a distaste for
mistake as an excuse, may be helpful. Professor Gilmore offers the
Holmesian formulation of Raffles v. Wichelhaus45 ("which . . . is to the

39. Id. at 21-22. Professor Gilmore is actually referring here to the later
development, by Williston, of these "subsidiary propositions" which were "unquestionably faithful to the spirit of the master's thought." Id. at 114 n.43.
40. Id. at 22.
41. [1876] 2 Ch. D. 463 (C.A.).
42. The actual language of Lord Justice Mellish is "[T]he two minds must be in
agreement at some one time .... " But, in fairness to Holmes, Mellish also said:
"He was not in point of law bound to hold the offer over .... " and referred to the
offer as "a mere offer" and "a mere nudum pactum." Id. at 474-75.
43. GILMoRE at 22.
44. Id. at 22-34.
45. 2 Hurl. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
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ordinary run of case law as the recently popular theatre of the absurd is
to the ordinary run of theatre" 46 ) as characteristic. The facts of the case
are simple, if bizarre. Buyer and seller agreed to the purchase and sale of
cotton "to arrive ex Peerless from Bombay." The buyer refused to accept
delivery on the grounds that the cotton was from the wrong ship Peerless.
Indeed there were two, each sailing from Bombay and each, presumably,
carrying cotton. The case was decided, so far as one can tell, 47 squarely
on the "meeting of the minds" grounds argued by buyer's counsel Mellish. 48
In this analysis, sinceneither party meant the same thing, there was no
meeting of the minds and no binding agreement.
Of Holmes's analysis of Raffles, Gilmore says: "The magician who
could 'objectify' Raffles v. Wichelhaus ... could, the need arising, objectify

anything. '49 Holmes had determined that the "true ground of decision"
was not that the parties "meant" different things but that "each said a
different thing. The plaintiff offered one thing, the defendant expressed his
assent to another."5 Standing alone, this is hardly a satisfactory explanation of the case, but for those who chose to accept it, or who knew no
better, Holmes had deftly converted a question of fact into a rule of law.
The factual inquiry had been: What did the parties intend? The rule of
law was: No enforceable agreement can exist where there is no reference
to a common subject-matter. 5'
A fundamental defect of the "objectivist" approach was its inability
to deal with anything as subjective as mistake. But so long as this defect
could be swept along in a logically defensible scheme, the problem could
be thought to have gone away. This would close the door on laborious,
52
factual inquiries which threatened disorder in an orderly, abstract world.

46. GILMORE at 35.
47. All we have is: "PER CURIAM. There must be judgment for the defendants."
2 Hurl. & C. at 908, 159 Eng. Rep. at 376. Presumably, defence counsel's argument
prevailed.
48. Later Lord Justice Mellish wrote the "meeting of the minds" opinion of
the Court of Appeal in Dickinson v. Dodds, as good an example of the subjective
approach as may be found. See text accompanying notes 4243 supra.
49. GILMORE at 41.
50. 0. HOLMEs, TH COMMON LAw (M. Howe ed. 1963), quoted by GILMORE
at 41.
51. Holmes explained the case again, many years later, in this way: "In such
a case [where a proper name is used] we let in evidence of intention not to help out
what theory recognizes as an uncertainty of speech, and to read what the writer meant
into what he has tried but failed to say, but, recognizing that he has spoken with
theoretic certainty, we inquire what he meant in order to find out what he has said.
It is on this ground that there is no contract when the proper name used by one party
means one ship, and that used by the other means another [citations to Raffles]. The
mere difference of intent as such is immaterial." Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. RZv. 417, 418 (1899).
52. For an example of the disorder which the subjective approach can lead to,
if taken to extremes, see National Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99
(Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
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The immediate aftermath of the Industrial Revolution demanded efficiency;
rules of law would assist the unhindered flow of commerce where factual
inquiry would only hold things up. And with the arrival of the corporate
person, there was perhaps as much sense to an objective approach as to
asking what the corporate party thought, or believed, or intended. The
move for abstraction was in large part a product of the times.
The purpose of "objectification" was, in a word, certainty. 53 Abstracted law can be controlled more readily; questions of law by-pass juries
and yield ultimate formative influence to appellate courts. The more law
can be objectified, the greater the chance it can be unified. The more it
can be unified, the more sense it makes to have "national" law schools.
The more sense it makes to have such law schools, the more influential they
become. And if an influential school, like Harvard, has an influential ally
in this endeavor, like Holmes, then a highly abstract, cohesive general
theory of law can take root as though spontaneous. For so long as the
two extremities of judge-made law, the schools and the ultimate court
of appeal, were under like influence, there was a good chance that a
logical construct like Contract could be transplanted into the common law
system. Who was there, after all, to object?
According to Gilmore, the classical theory of contract existed in its
pure form only in the heads, the books and the classrooms of certain men.
Although not generally found in the courts of law, it was accurately
reflected in Langdell's "laboratory" - the law library. The publishers,
handmaidens to the "national" law schools, and dependent on their influence, had organized the cases along the lines of the great theorists. If the
academic organizer was Williston, the "grass roots" organizer was the
West Publishing Company.5 4 The first generation of lawyers trained in
the newly "nationalized" schools - and these were the most influential
practitioners of the day - came to believe instinctively that to each fixed,
immutable and universal principle West had assigned a number. Every
true and worthy thought in the legal universe could be tracked down to
the very end of its world. All was accounted for. The scientific legal
environment left behind by the Langdellians, the libraries which are to this
day more like laboratories than like libraries at large, were not a benign
environment for original thought. By their very organization, they fed
the theory into the practice of law so that Holmesian history became,
paradoxically, a self-fulfilling prophecy.
53. Judge Frank, concurring in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 761
(2d Cir. 1946), put it this way: "The objectivists transferred from the field of torts
that stubborn anti-subjectivist, the 'reasonable man'; so that, in part at least, advocacy
of the 'objective' standard in contracts appears to have represented a desire for legal
symmetry, legal uniformity, a desire seemingly prompted by aesthetic impulses."
54. "Whether the West Publishing Company, like the discoverer of the atomic
bomb, should be looked on as a benefactor of mankind or as an enemy of the human
race is a problem of moral philosophy with which a lawyer is ill equipped to deal."
Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041 (1961).
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Having spent his first two chapters tracing the origins and development of the theory whose death he sets out to chronicle, Professor Gilmore
moves, in chapter three to the Decline and Fall. It was to take unusually
perspicacious and determined scholars to penetrate the armor which West,
after the theorists, had thrown around the law. It was one thing to
assault the whole, to make doctrine itself the foe; the Legal Realists did
this and found nothing to put in its stead.55 But it was quite another to
challenge from within, to seek out what Gilmore calls the "case law
undergrounds"5 6 by developing respectable theories which ran right across
conventional categories. Lon Fuller's work on the reliance interest in
contract damages, 57 and Friedrich Kessler's on good faith,58 are offered
as outstanding examples. More broadly, the classical theory was undermined by the work of Cardozo and Corbin, "the engineers of its destruction."'59 In judicial and academic guise, these engineers correspond nicely
to Holmes and Williston, the judicial and the academic construction
engineers.
Corbin was at Yale and became Williston's second-in-command in
drafting the first Restatement ;6o Cardozo was Chief Justice of the New
York Court of Appeals and, like Holmes, went on to the Supreme Court.
The law of contract propounded by the Court of Appeals under Cardozo
was far more responsive, flexible and uncertain than the "correct" contract
law which Harvard had marketed half a century before. No one knows
quite how mischievous Cardozo thought he was being as he seemed to
employ chutzpah as a jurisprudential device, playing his game with their
rules and so standing the good Williston's best intentions on their heads.
That this is what he did is best seen in a series of New York cases with
which he lovingly dug the grave of classical consideration theory, all the

55. See generally Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, supra note 54.
56. GILMORE at 56.
57. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1-2), 46
YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37).
58. Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargainingin Good Faith, and Freedom
of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARv. L. REv. 401 (1964).

59. GILMORE at 57.
60. [F]or within the hollow crown
That rounds the mortal temples of a king
Keeps Death his court, and there the antic sits,
Scoffing his state and grinning at his pomp,
Allowing him a breath, a little scene,
To monarchize, be fear'd, and kill with looks,
Infusing him with self and vain conceit,
As if this flesh which walls about our life,
Were brass impregnable; and humour'd thus
Comes at the last with a little pin
Bores through his castle wall, andfarewell King I
W. SHAKESPEARE, Richard II, Act III, Scene II.
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while professing to apply it with full rigor. 61 While others looked to
Williston (and to West), who had mapped out all paths of inquiry, Cardozo
surreptitiously left behind him a little trail of case-law markers, then
62
turned to point at these "signposts on the road."
The occasion of this revelation was a case concerning the power of
one Mary Yates Johnson to revoke her pledge of a charitable contribution
to Allegheny College, payable after her death. After referring to Holmes's
observation that the courts were failing properly to distinguish between
that detriment which was merely a consequence of the promise and that
which was bargained for, Cardozo continued: "The tendency toward effacement had not lessened with the years. On the contrary, there has grown
up of recent days a doctrine that a substitute for consideration or an exception to its ordinary requirements can be found in what is styled 'a promissory estoppel' (citing Williston)."" Neither of the cases he then referred
to as "signposts on the road" used the term "promissory estoppel"; each
was decided in terms of consideration. 64 Indeed, he decided the Allegheny
College case on the grounds that the college assumed "a duty" "to communicate to the world, or in any event to applicants for the scholarship,
the title of the memorial. '6 5 The duty arose when a part payment was
accepted during her lifetime and before her revocation. This implied
promise bound the donor so that she could no longer revoke her pledge.
Thus, by weakening the consideration requirement beyond measure, and
referring to promissory estoppel as an alternative ground of recovery,
Cardozo laid the foundation for the doctrine to develop. Its recognition
and adoption, first by the New York Courts then, through Corbin, by
"national" common law, was the crucial factor in the demise of the classical
consideration theory.
Corbin's attack was "more forthright"6 than Cardozo's as he challenged the stubborn Williston and persuaded him to recognize promissory
estoppel by the inclusion of Section 90 in the Restatement First. Gilmore
offers a remarkable anecdote about how this occurred.617 The enormous
expansion of Section 90 between Restatements First and Second indicates
the extent to which promissory estoppel became a "mainstream" doctrine
in the courts.
Professor Gilmore's perceptions of Corbin, under whom he studied,
are noteworthy: "Corbin's abiding interest was in what he called the 'opera61. Allegheny College v. National Chautaugua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159
N.E. 173 (1927); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214
(1917); DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917).

62. Allegheny College v. National Chautaugua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 374,
159 N.E. 173, 175 (1927).
63. Id. at 373-74, 159 N.E. at 174-75.
64. Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414 (1923)

Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917).
65. 246 N.Y. at 376, 159 N.E. at 175.
66. GILMORE at 57.
67. Id. at 62-65.

and DeCicco v.
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tive facts' of cases; he had no love for, indeed little patience with, doctrine. ' 68 His belief that certainty in the law is an illusion, that the
mechanical application of doctrine derives from "the delusion that law is
absolute and eternal," 69 set him on a collision course with Williston. As
Gilmore puts it: "Corbin's entire discussion of consideration theory is
essentially a demonstration that the Holmesian model was wrong - wrong
as a matter of historical fact (which, of course, it was) and also wrong as
'
a matter of social policy (which is a different question entirely). 70
Corbin's main ideas, formulated around 1910, were far from conventional. By 1950, when his treatise on Contracts (which Gilmore describes
as "the greatest law book ever written" 71 ) was published, it looked like the
work of an Establishment figure. His role as second-in-command of the
Restatement also looked like an Establishment position, and Gilmore concedes that he cannot explain the apparent paradox. 7 2 After all, the Restatement was devoted to doctrine, designed to shore it up against attack.
Professor Gilmore chronicles the fate of the three mainstays of Holmesian classicism (consideration, absolute liability and restrictive contract
damages) during the period of Corbin's domination. He compares the
First Restatement with the Second to show how the law had been "Corbinized."173 And in doing so, he demonstrates that Restatements are useful
evidence of current thinking at the time of their drafting. It may even be
that their main value is historical; they are the common law's sealed chests
of everyday artifacts, certain to be found by some future generation bent
on understanding the past.
The author makes no secret of his alignment with the revisionsts; for
him the Second Restatement, the revised law of contract, was a reflection
of the inevitable: "The future, of course, won, as it always does." '74 He
characterizes the "Corbinization" of law as a relief from the unwarranted
confines of "the construct" and clearly prefers a fluid and adaptable common law, freed from the bonds of doctrinal certainty - chaos and all. The
twenty-odd pages in which he traces the process of doctrinal disintegration
are among the most rewarding of the book. So ends Professor Gilmore's
survey of "the brief, happy life of the general theory of contract." 75
I suggested early in this review that Professor Gilmore's book is
better described as fable about law than as a history. I think that characterization accurately conveys the author's purpose, explains his particular
68. Id. at 58.
69. Id., quoting 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 109 (1963).
70. GILMORE at 58.
71. Id. at 57.
72. "Why was he not outside on the barricades leading the revolutionary
troops . . . ? I simply do not know the answer to that question." Id. at 60.
73. Id. at 70.
74. Id. at 65.
75. Id. at 85.
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use of rhetoric and puts into perspective his frequent appeal to hyperbole.
At the very least, this is not a book to be read straight-faced.
At the same time, there is a historical message here. Roughly stated,
it is that the Holmesians subjected the law of contract to a logical construct having little or no common law legitimacy. The revisionists, Corbin
and Cardozo, came to the rescue. Doctrine was eased aside by factual inquiry and by judicial juggling. Certainty was made to yield to the needs
of a changing commerce. And at the heart of it all, consideration gave way
to promissory estoppel. This was the objective notion of "the bargain"
being usurped by the founding of liability on the creation of a reasonable
expectation. From that central appeal to the subjective came the end
of Contract.
So far as this historical message is concerned, the author pays a price
for the pleasure of his particular style. His pleasure is our delight, so the
price may not be too high. But we should recognize that by dealing in
universals, Professor Gilmore has obscured the very parochial nature of
his book. This is perhaps its greatest shortcoming. A useful way to redress the imbalance, to place this American experience in the broader
scheme of things, is to look at the present state of English contract law.
Langdell and Holmes began with selected English cases from the middle
of the nineteenth century. Professor Gilmore makes particular reference
to the English cases which Holmes used to develop his "rules" 76 and later
suggests that: "[T]he doctrinal statement of contract theory was carried
to much greater extremes in this country than it ever was in England." 77
But he does not follow through, comparing today's English law with
today's American law in an effort to isolate those American strains which
are vestiges of "the construct" and its repercussions.
If we take seriously the reasons given by Gilmore for the rise of the
theorists in this country, it is not surprising that English law experienced
nothing similar. The work of the Langdellians made sense in the face of
disunity. There was no need to promote "national" law schools in a country
blessed with a single jurisdiction. Order need be imposed only where disorder makes life difficult. Nineteenth century England experienced nothing comparable with the legal difficulty which America's burgeoning national
commerce encountered in crossing state lines. There was no English
counterpart to the tensions of the movement toward federalism. And the
jury, the bane of the objectivists here, was soon out of harm's way banished from civil causes.78 In the short space available for this comparison, I shall limit myself to a look at English consideration doctrine
since, in its Holmesian formulation, it was "the balance wheel" of Contract, and the development of its "anti-matter," promissory estoppel, was
76.
77.
78.
severely

Id. at 22-34.
Id. at 99-100.
This began as early as 1854 with the Common Law Procedure Act which
curtailed the role of the jury in civil causes. See 15 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds. 1965).
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central to the theory's decline. It is important to understand the relationship of estoppel to any traditional formulation of contract, particularly the
way in which a consideration requirement is undermined once expectation becomes an alternative ground for recovery. Any strong contract
doctrine, in traditional mold, must control its own domain. Alternative
grounds for recovery, on purely "contract" facts, necessarily undermine
that doctrine.
If we turn to English law today, we find two notable features. First,
consideration looks much more like the product of Holmes's "bargain
theory" than what remains of that theory in this country. Second, promissory estoppel hardly exists. Two questions suggest themselves. First, how
false was Holmes's theory, how far a departure from tradition? Second,
why has promissory estoppel never really developed in English law?
For brevity, and because I believe it to be accurate, I shall let the
current edition of Cheshire and Fifoot 7a speak to the first question:

The antithesis of benefit and detriment, though reiterated in the courts,
is not altogether happy. The use of the word 'detriment,' in particular,
obscures the vital transformation of assumpsit from a species of action
on the case to a general remedy in contract. So long as it remained
tortious in character, it was necessary to prove that the plaintiff had
suffered damage in reliance upon the defendant's undertaking. When
it became contractual, the courts concentrated, not on the consequences
of the defendant's fault, but on the facts present at the time of the
agreement and in return for which the defendant's promise was given.
Detriment is clearly a more appropriate description of the former than
of the latter situation. Nor is this criticism of merely antiquarian
interest. The typical modern contract is the bargain struck by the
exchange of promises.80
In the language of purchase and sale, the authors say:
The plaintiff must show that he has bought the defendant's promise
either by doing some act in return for it or by offering a counterpromise. 8 '
This definition of consideration as the price paid by the plaintiff for
the defendant's promise is, they say, preferable to "the nineteenth century
terminology of benefit and detriment." It is easier to understand, it corresponds accurately to the everyday exchange of promises and it emphasizes
"the commercial character of the English contract." What is more:
When, in the sixteenth century, the common lawyers evolved a general
law of contract, they based it unhesitantingly on the idea of bargain;
and save when they wavered under
the influence of Lord Mansfield,
2
they have not departed from it.8
79. G. CHESHIRE & C. FIFOOT, "LAw OF CoNTRAcT" (8th ed. 1972), generally
taken to be the leading English work on the subject.
80. Id. at 59-60.
81. Id. at 60.
82. Id. Compare GmoIOE at 18-19.
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If this, the traditional English view, is accepted, it throws a very
different light on our story. It suggests that at least where consideration
is concerned, Holmes had more history on his side than Gilmore generally
allows. For in this view, it is the "bargain theory" which is traditional,
"the nineteenth century terminology of benefit and detriment" abberational.
Let us complete the picture by considering our second question: Why
has promissory estoppel never developed to any extent in English law?
Interestingly enough, the doctrine made its first modern English
appearance in a case similar to Foakes v. Beers,s3 from which Holmes
took his "rule" that a release from liability to pay money was not binding
without independent consideration. In the High Trees House case,8 4 landlords had agreed to accept only half the agreed rent if the tenants would
remain in occupancy. This was wartime London; tenants were likely to
leave. When the war was over, the landlords sued for the "other half"
of the rent for part of 1945 because the tenants had refused to pay the
old rent after London returned to normal. In giving judgment for the
plaintiffs, Denning J., then, as now, one of England's more imaginative
judges, ventured the suggestion, obiter, that a suit for monies owed in
respect of the wartime years could be met with the defence of promissory
estoppel. Although lack of consideration would have been fatal to an action
on the promise, it was no bar to a defence.
An effort to expand this limited notion of estoppel was made three
years later in Combe v. Combe.8 5 Defendant's ex-wife sued for breach of
a promise to make maintenance payments. The promise was unsupported
by consideration but, as intended by the defendant, plaintiff had relied on
the promise in refraining from seeking a permanent maintenance order.
At trial, Mr. Justice Byrne upheld the ex-wife's claim, following the dicta
of Mr. Justice Denning in High Trees House. On appeal, Lord Justice
Denning8 6 set the matter straight:
Much as I am inclined to favour the principle stated in the High Trees
case, it is important that it should not be stretched too far, lest it
should be endangered. That principle does not create new causes of
action where none existed before. It only prevents a party from insisting on his strict legal rights, when it would be unjust to allow him
to enforce them, having regard to the dealings between the parties. 87
83. 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L. 1884).
84. Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., [1947]
K.B. 130.
85. [1951] 2 K.B. 215.
86. "L.J." means Lord Justice, a member of the Court of Appeal. Subsequently,
Denning was promoted again, to become a law lord, but later "demoted" himself to
Master of the Rolls (head of the Court of Appeal) in the belief that this is a more
influential position from which to effect change. See England's Most Revolutionari
Judge, The Sunday Times (London), June 17 and June 24, 1973, at 33, col. 1
87. [1951] 2 K.B. 215, 219.
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Thus spoke one of England's great judicial innovators.8 8 His formulation
was later referred to by a member of the House of Lords as too broad:
"I do not wish to lend the authority of this House to the statement of
principle which is to be found in Combe v. Combe and may well be far too
widely stated."8 9 But only last year, Denning, M.R., restated the principle
more narrowly: "[I] f the plaintiff makes the promise knowing or intending that the other will act on it, and he does act on it, then a court of equity
will not allow him to go back on that promise .... "90 As is commonly said,
in English law promissory estoppel is a shield, not a sword. And, one
might add, a mighty narrow shield at that.
Now all this is at a far remove from the doctrine enshrined in section
90 of the Restatement First, and in a different world altogether from the
expanded version of Restatement Second. 91 In England, it would be
section 75 which accurately states the law. 92
With the advantage of this added perspective, we may now retrace
our American steps, looking particularly at the development of promissory
estoppel. 93 Bearing in mind that it is the English doctrine, not the American, which is in line with the rest of the common law world, 94 our question
becomes: Why did promissory estoppel develop so broadly and so rapidly
in this country?
Accepting Professor Gilmore's chronicle of its development,95 it
seems that promissory estoppel developed as a way of escaping the confines
of the particularly narrow Holmesian consideration doctrine. It may be
that this was the only, or as good as any, way around the logical construct,
that working from within was a hopeless task. Either way, this suggested
analysis goes beyond Professor Gilmore's implication when he says:
88. For the several reactions of four law lords to Denning's greatest heresy purporting to overrule the House of Lords from the Court of Appeal, see Broome v.
Cassell & Co., [1972] A.C. 1027; (Hailsham, L.J.), id. at 1052E-1055B; (Reid, L.J.),
id. at 1084F-G; (Dilhorne, Viscount), id. at 1107D; and (Wilberforce, L.J.), id.
at 1113C. See also Launchbury v. Morgans, [1971] 2 Q.B. 245, 2 W.L.R. 602, 1 All
E.R. 642, rev'd by the House of Lords, [1973] A.C. 127, [1972] W.L.R. 1217, 2 All
E.R. 606. See generally England's Most Revolutionary Judge, The Sunday Times
(London), June 17 and June 24, 1973, at 33, col. 1.
89. Tool Metal Mfg. Co. v. Tungsten Elec. Co., [1955] 2 All E.R. 657, 660E-F,
[1955] 1 W.L.R. 761, 764 (Simonds, Viscount) (obiter dictum).
90. Crabb v. Arun District Council, [1975] 3 All E.R. 865, 871 E-F.
91. Gilmore discusses the expansion at 71-72 and concludes: "Thus the unwanted stepchild of Restatement (First) has become a basic principle of Restatement
(Second) .... " (referring to language in the Commentary to § 90 (Second)).
92. G. CHESHIRE & C. FIFOOT, supra note 79, at 60 n.1, which also cites WILLXsTON,
supra note 21, with approval.
93. See cases cited at note 61 supra.
94. See generally Seddon, Is Equitable Estoppel Alive or Dead in Australiat,
24 INT. & CoMP. L.Q. 438 (1975), an article which discusses the subject more broadly
than the title suggests.
95. GILMORE at 62-65.
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The trouble was that businessmen, adapting to changing circumstance,
kept doing things differently. The "general theory" required that,
always and everywhere, things remain as they had, in theory, always
been.96
While agreeing with his diagnosis, I resist the implication that what followed was a cure, that the law, after Cardozo and Corbin, was more
reflective of commercial reality. My own characterization is a little different.
The English corpus juris which the American theorists seized on was
a living thing, a flexible body of common law. In the interests, let us say,
of certainty, the Langdellians pinned certain joints. Consideration, excuse
and damages were selected; their pinning at once limited movement and
prevented growth. As time passed, the real world changed. But the corpus
could not change with it. Increasingly rigid, it became vulnerable. And
97
in the event, it took just a stiff revisionist breeze to blow it flat.
Now look at England. No pinning, no trauma, no surgery; rather, a
body of law quite able to withstand assaults. Such is the nature of the
common law. But much more impressive in our scheme of things is that
the body is still standing: English contract law is alive and well.
Indeed, when America relented, recognizing frustration as an excuse
and reasonable expectation as a basis for contract damages, it adopted
English developments. 98 England's unhampered common law had permitted their development; the Langdellians had denied them. Such flexible
doctrine never gave rise to the search for an alternative theory of liability,
so that promissory estoppel, seized upon here as an escape, is barely
acknowledged in England.
With this added perspective, it becomes clear that American contract
law owes as much of its uniqueness in the common law world to the revisionists as to the theorists. True, it was the theorists who first formulated an American doctrine, separate and distinguishable from the English.
But in throwing it over, the revisionists cut more fundamental doctrinal
96. GILMORE at 34.
97. Gilmore puts it thus: "Had the structure itself been, so to say, modernized
or made more habitable, the courts, in making good their escape, might not have been
compelled to tear the whole thing down." Id. at 101.
98. The development of frustration, as distinct from impossibility, as an excuse
for non-performance is generally attributed to "the coronation cases," Krell v. Henry,
[1903] 2 K.B. 740 and Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K.B. 493. In Krell v. Henry,
Vaughan Williams, L.J., purported to apply the rule set down by Blackburn, J., in
Taylor v. Caldwell, [1853] B.&S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 313, namely that a condition was to be implied as to "the continued existence of a given person or thing."
But Vaughan Williams shifted the formulation to "the existence of a particular state
of things," [1903] 2 K.B. at 749, which, it may be, is the entire distinction between
impossibility and frustration.
For a discussion of the development of doctrine in this area, see Corbin,
"Recent Developments in the Law of Contracts," 50 HARv. L. REv. 449, 464-65 (1937).
The damage formula which finally overcame resistance was that of Hadley
v. Baxendale, [1854] 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145. See GILMORE at 49-53 and 83-84.
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ties than the Langdellians ever did. They were no less revolutionaries than
those they dispossessed.
In his final chapter, "Conclusions and Speculations," Professor Gilmore speculates that in this country "'contract' is being reabsorbed into
the mainstream of 'tort.'-99 With "the bargain" effectively displaced by
expectation as the notion from which contractual liability proceeds, his
observation is fair enough. If contract is moving toward tort in this country, it is worth observing that in England it is the other way about. In
English law, it is tort, the traditional category of residual liability, which
is moving toward contract through the hesitant development of negligent
misstatement.1 00
Of course, liability for negligent misstatement and liability flowing
from a promise, by estoppel, are not the same thing. They are separated
by that divide with which we choose to distinguish our two "halves" of
civil liability. But each deals with a two-party situation in which one
party's expectations are affected by the other. Each has developed to overcome traditional contract limitations. And each moves one half of civil
liability toward the other. But it is the English experience which is the
more traditional, with tort expanding, contract staying put.
The Death of Contract is an unusually rewarding book. At one level,
it offers a marvellously readable, impressionistic picture of the first hundred years of American contract law. At another, it suggests a broader
view: "What went on in Contract is merely a special instance of what
went on everywhere."'u 0 What went on everywhere was the Americanization of the common law under the influence of Federalism. Another phenomenon of the period was the socialization of law, its transition from an
instrument of laissez-faire economic theory (which Gilmore characterizes
as: "If we all do exactly as we please, no doubt everything will work out
for the best"' 02 ) to a reflection of the welfare-state notion that we are "all
99.

GILMORE

at 87.

100. Negligent misstatement is a very recent doctrine in English law, generally
attributed to Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465; 3
W.L.R. 101; [1963] 2 All E.R. 575. There the House of Lords established the
principle that a bank negligently misstating the credit-worthiness of a customer to an
inquiring party could be liable for damages suffered in reliance on that statement.

This is tort liability. Compare Mutual Life & Citizens' Assurance Co. v. Evatt, [1971]
A.C. 793. Of particular interest are the comments of the majority upon what the two
dissenting law lords in Mutual Life meant in their opinions in Hedley Byrne. See
also Esso Petroleum Co. v. Mardon, [1976] 2 All E.R. 5, particularly the discussion
of contract and tort (Denning, M.R.), id. at 15; (Ormand, L.J.), id. at 22; and
(Shaw, L.J.), id. at 26C-G.
The American position is discussed in Hill, Damages For Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 679 (1973). See also Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54,
250 N.E.2d 656 (1969); Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974);
Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
101. GILMORE at 102.
102. Id. at 95. Voltaire's Docteur Pangloss put it this way:

"[L]es malheurs particuliers font le bien giniral; de sorte que plus il y a de
malheurs particuliers, et plus tout est bien." ([Pirivate misfortunes constitute
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cogs in a machine, each dependent on the other."'103 Implicit in this idea
of the socialization of law is the belief that, in the long run, law reflects
life, not life law. That is where this story began and, of course, where it
ends. In between is the clearest demonstration that Contract, though dead,
is even yet a worthwhile subject of study.
Anthony I. Waters*

the general good; so that the more private misfortunes there are, the better is
the whole.) Candide, Ch. 4.
There has been a recent resurgence of the view that legal rules ought to
serve a laissez-faire function, now in the interest of market efficiency. See generally
R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973).
103. GILMORE at 95.
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